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1. Introduction 
 
Online Travel Agencies (OTAs) have gained considerable importance as a distribution 
channel for independent hotels and hotel chains around the world. OTAs provide many 
benefits to consumers in facilitating a wide search and comparison of hotels.1 In principle, this 
can translate into fiercer competition across hotels. Additionally, OTAs may help independent 
and new hotels to enter the market or to operate on a larger scale, which may also be beneficial 
for consumers. On the other hand, OTAs represent one of the most expensive booking 
channels for hotels accounting for about 10%-20% of a night’s room rate.2 Thus, a higher 
fraction of sales flowing through this distribution channel may end up increasing hotels’ 
operating costs and prices faced by travelers. 
In this context, OTAs and hotels instituted “wide” most-favored nation (MFN) clauses 
that ensured hotels and other OTAs could not set rates for hotel rooms that were below those 
of an OTA. In the hotel industry, these are called Price Parity Clauses (PPCs) The wide-PPC 
that became the industry standard reportedly required hotels to offer the same or a better 
room price on a given OTA than the prices offered on competing sales channels, including 
other OTAs and the hotels' own direct online channels. This practice can reduce free-riding 
behavior from other distribution channels and, in this way, would promote OTAs’ 
investments and would avoid direct price charges to final users. (See Ezrachi, 2016, Wang and 
Wright, 2020.) Absent the PPC clauses, a hotel could have an incentive to advertise its rooms 
on a given OTA, and then offer lower prices for the same products on its own website, thereby 
avoiding the payment of commission fees. Note that, to our knowledge, there is no empirical 
evidence of the actual relevance and magnitudes of free-riding behavior. 
However, potentially undesired anticompetitive effects could emerge from the 
establishment of such clauses. One theory is based on the impossibility for hotels to respond 
to an increase in commission fees of a given OTA, by setting higher retail prices in this OTA 
in comparison to other channels. This restriction for hotels to divert sales to cheaper channels 
 
1 OTAs play an important role in online reputations of hotels through their reviews and ratings, which in turn 
receive management attention and hotel response. (See Proserpio and Zerbas, 2017.) 
2 See the following online article titled “Pillow Fight: Hotels vs. Online Travel Agencies”, June 23th 2016. Article 
retrieved on August 7th 2017 from the following link: https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/hotels-vs-online-
travel-agencies 
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may create the incentives for competing OTAs to simultaneously increase commission fees in 
equilibrium, resulting in higher distribution costs for hotels and in higher retail prices for 
travelers. In this vein, Boik and Corts (2016) develop a theoretical model in which platform 
most-favored-nation (PMFN) clauses may indeed result in both higher commission fees 
charged by intermediary platforms and in higher retail prices. 3 , 4  In another approach, 
Edelman and Wright (2015) suggest that retail prices may be inflated because intermediaries 
who deliver a value to buyers can raise demand for their services by preventing buyers from 
paying higher amounts for intermediary purchases, leading to inflated prices and excessive 
adoption of intermediary services, over-investment by intermediaries and reduced consumer 
surplus.  
Some theoretical research points out ambiguities in the implications of MFNs for 
consumers. Wang and Wright (2020) suggest that prevention of showrooming effects is an 
important element of MFN clauses, among platforms that lower search costs. They suggest 
that, while wide price-parity clauses are bad for consumers, that narrow MFNs have 
ambiguous effects and could improve consumer surplus.5 The ambiguity may be particularly 
important in comparison to completely eliminating PPCs. Johansen and Vergé (2017) suggest 
that even wide PPCs can have ambiguous effects to the extent that sellers’ participation 
constraints prevent a guaranteed high commission.  
MFNs may be linked to other mechanism for inducing price uniformity. Similarly, price 
uniformity is not necessarily harmful. Akman and Sokol (2017) argue that online resale prince 
maintenance (RPM) can resemble online MFNs. Fletcher and Hviid (2017) explain the manner 
in which some aspects of MFNs may bear substantial similarity to the worst horizontal 
element of RPM, and could yield, as Ezrachi (2015) notes, price uniformity effects. As a 
potential benefit of price uniformity, Sridhar and Winter (2006) suggest that price matching 
guarantees can signal to uninformed consumers that a firm has low prices. 
 
3 In a different theoretical model, Johnson (2017) also finds that under an agency model between sellers and 
intermediaries (i.e., sellers determine retail prices, and pay a per-transaction commission fee to intermediaries), 
PMFNs raise commission fees and retail prices.   
4 A second theory of harm is linked to the fact that wide-PPCs have the potential to act as entry barriers. Indeed, 
under a PPC regime, it is more difficult for a new OTA to enter or expand its market share via the offer of lower 
commission rates in exchange for hotels offering lower retail prices for their rooms. In line with this intuition, Boik 
and Corts (2016) show that under certain conditions, PPCs can indeed act as entry deterrents. 
5 Wals and Schinkel (2018) have pointed out one respect in which the ambiguity disappears, namely when narrow 
PPCs are combined with best price guarantees. 
4 
 
Potential economic and legal concerns over OTA market power and PPC clauses have led 
to a regulatory response, particularly with respect to wide PPCs that would apply to all of a 
hotel’s transactions. In 2015, competition authorities from France, Italy and Sweden adopted 
parallel decisions accepting identical commitments from their market-leading OTA, 
Booking.com. In particular, Booking.com committed itself to switch from wide-PPCs to 
narrow-PPCs in its contracts with hotels located in E.U. countries. In practice, this switch 
translates into the possibility for hotels to offer lower prices on alternative OTAs and on their 
own direct channels, provided that these latter discounts are part of a loyalty program (and 
thus not directly advertised to the general public). The second largest OTA in the market, i.e., 
Expedia, also committed itself to switch to narrow-PPCs in the E.U. during the year 2015. 
Nevertheless, the European Commission (EC) also suggested concerns could arise 
regarding the presence of narrow-PPCs.6 The hypothesis is that this type of clause is related 
to the existence of reduced incentives for hotels to offer differentiated prices on different 
OTAs. Specifically, under a narrow-PPC regime, retail prices posted on the direct channel 
cannot be lower than retail prices posted on the most-expensive OTA.7 Therefore, offering low 
retail prices on a low-cost OTA (in order to divert sales to cheaper channels) would necessarily 
cannibalize the sales of the hotel direct channel. For this reason, hotels’ incentives to price 
differentiate across OTAs would be reduced.  
With the purpose of evaluating the impact of the regulatory natural experiment, we 
empirically assess the impact of the switch from wide-PPC to narrow-PPC on online booking 
prices in the E.U. using data from a group of hotel chains. Indeed, on the one hand, the lower 
incentives to price differentiate across channels potentially induced by narrow-PPCs should 
be particularly stronger for hotel chains because the direct channel represents a relevant 
substitute for OTAs (and thus the potential cannibalization of own sales should be a real 
concern). However, on the other hand, hotel chains are also more likely to hold a loyalty 
program, which could allow them to undercut prices posted on OTAs. In this latter scenario, 
the theory of harm associated to narrow-PPCs should not necessarily hold. 
 
6 See Paragraph 3 of the report on the monitoring exercise of the online booking sector carried out by the EC, 
available at the following link:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf 
7 This reasoning holds under the assumption that narrow-PPCs clauses are widely adopted by OTAs, or at least by 
the major OTAs in the market. 
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Using proprietary hotel-level data from different hotel chains that operate in European 
countries and also from hotels operating in a number of countries around the world, we carry 
out a simple reduced form analysis to test whether price differentiation across channels 
increased after the regulation change. This analysis represents an empirical test of the theory 
of harm associated to narrow-PPCs. Specifically, we compare average booking prices posted 
by these chains on the two largest OTAs of the market and on their own online direct channels, 
during years 2014 and 2016 for hotels located in the E.U. and in a group of non-E.U. countries. 
In other words, before-after and difference-in-differences analyses are performed using data 
from multiple hotel chains. The idea is to test whether the switch to narrow-PPCs has had an 
impact on the price differential between OTAs and the direct channel. Under the theory of 
harm postulated by the EC, the impact of the PPC switch on this price differential should not 
be significant.  
Results from the before-after analysis suggest that, following the switch to narrow-PPC in 
the EU, average retail prices offered on the direct channel are more likely to be cheaper than 
average prices posted on OTAs. This result is robust to the comparison with retail prices 
posted in hotels located outside the E.U. (i.e., from a difference-in-differences analysis), but 
only for mid-level and luxury hotels. However, the difference-in-differences estimator shows 
no significant effects in France, and a significant effect in Germany but only for the mid-level 
hotels’ segment. In these two countries, MFC clauses (including narrow-PPCs) between OTAs 
and hotels have been totally or partially banned. These latter results can be interpreted in two 
different ways. First, they may cast doubt on the effectiveness of the policy intervention, as no 
significant effect is observed in these countries compared to the average effect on non-EC 
countries. Second, they may be caused by the fact that the direct channel could have become 
relatively cheaper than OTAs in both E.U. and non-E.U. countries. For instance, retail 
reservation prices paid by EC citizens for hotel rooms located outside the E.U. may have also 
been influenced by the policy change. 
This paper adds substantially to existing work on PPC clauses. Hunold et al. (2018) use 
data on posted prices for hotel rooms on OTAs (for instance, Booking.com and Expedia) and 
hotels’ direct channels, during the period January-2016 to January-2017. The data was 
collected from the metasearch website Kayak.com. Taking advantage of the fact that 
Booking.com was prohibited to use narrow PPCs in Germany since February 2016, they 
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compare changes in some relevant outcomes in this country with respect to changes in other 
European countries. Results suggest that the abolition of the narrow-PPC increased the use of 
both Booking.com and the direct channel by hotels. With respect to pricing, in line with our 
results, they find that hotel chains establish their direct channels more often as a cheaper 
channel relative to major OTAs and as the cheapest online channel available.  
Mantovani et al. (2017) analyze retail prices listed on Booking.com during the period 2014-
2016 in three touristic regions of France, Italy and Spain. Their results suggest that prices 
decreased in 2015 and bounced back in 2016. In addition, it is shown that the 2014-2015 price 
reduction was sharper in France and Italy, compared to Spain, and that the posterior 2015-
2016 price increase was less intense in these countries. The paper claims that these asymmetric 
changes across countries may be related to different intensities of antitrust enforcement, with 
France and Italy being more active than Spain in this regard. Finally, the paper suggests that 
the posterior 2016 price increase may be explained by demand shocks and/or technology 
improvements implemented by Booking.com (e.g., a better revenue management system). 
The European Commission reportedly collected room price data posted on major 
metasearch websites and on the largest OTAs of the market. The main specification applied 
was a difference-in-differences approach using pricing data provided by metasearch websites 
and using hotels located in Canada as control group. Price differentiation was defined as a 
binary variable that takes the value of one when the price posted on one OTA differs by at 
least five percent from prices posted on other OTAs. The results of this analysis suggested a 
significant increase in price differentiation across OTAs because of the switch from wide to 
narrow-PPCs and as a result of the additional prohibitions set by France and Germany. This 
dataset was limited, however, as it did not consist of actual transaction data and could not 
include non-observed direct prices.8 
 
8 Further, in 2016 a group of ten E.U. competition authorities carried out a coordinated monitoring exercise of the 
online hotel booking sector. The purpose of this exercise was to measure the effects of the recent changes in PPCs 
contracts introduced by the major OTAs in the market. According to survey responses from September 2016, the 
main changes observed by respondents as a result to the switch to narrow-PPCs were (i) 21% - 31% of hotels said 
that they have differentiated across OTAs in terms of prices and room availability, respectively, (ii) 40% of hotels 
said that they have undercut prices posted on OTAs (via lower prices posted on their direct channels), (iii) 30% of 
hotels said that at least on certain periods they have chosen to make rooms available exclusively on their own 
direct channels and not on OTAs, (iv) approximately 50% of the hotels said that sales through their loyalty 
programs have increased, and (v) 90% of hotels said that there were no changes in terms of OTAs’ commission 
fees. 
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The main distinguishing feature of this paper in comparison with previous empirical 
literature is that we rely on actual transaction prices. In addition, our dataset covers pre and 
post PPC removal periods (i.e., years 2014 and 2016), and it covers countries located both in 
and out of the EU, thus providing a substantial improvement in the empirical analysis of the 
existing theories of pricing behavior in the pricing parity, or MFN, literature. More generally, 
this paper contributes to evaluating these theories for the case of hotel chains and more 
broadly contributes to the literature on MFN clauses and price parity. 
Similar questions to those for hotels and OTAs arise, for example, in the no discount 
policies present in contracts between payment card platforms and retailers. Payment cards 
typically do not allow retailers to charge a lower price for a cash purchase than for a card 
purchase. This has the effect of ensuring consumers do not choose between card and cash by 
taking into account the merchant fees that are present on card transactions, much like the fees 
or commissions that may exist on OTA transactions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the evolution of 
PPC regulations in Europe. Section 3 presents the data and some basic summary statistics. 
Section 4 displays the results of an econometric assessment of the impact of the wide-PPC 
removal on booking prices. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our main conclusions.  
 
2. Price parity clauses in the E.U. 
 
In April 2015, in response to several antitrust concerns, competition authorities from France, 
Italy and Sweden, adopted parallel decisions accepting identical commitments from a market-
leading OTA, Booking.com.9 Specifically, these commitments are:10 
i. Booking.com cannot prevent hotels from offering better or equal room prices via 
competing OTAs (but not via the direct channel); 
ii. Booking.com cannot prevent hotels from offering discounted room prices provided 
that these are not marketed or made available to the general public online. In other 
 
9 For more details, see the following press release: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/ecn-
brief/en/content/french-italian-and-swedish-competition-authorities-accept-commitments-offered-
bookingcom#_ftn 
10 The commitments were proposed by Booking.com on December 2014, and they had to be mandatorily executed 
no later than July-2015. See the summary of the decision by the French Competition Authority, available at: 
https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/communiques-de-presse/21-april-2015-online-hotel-booking-sector 
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words, discounted prices can be offered online to members of a hotel’s loyalty 
program and/or via offline channels. 
These commitments were, in practice, extended by Booking.com and Expedia across the 
EU. Hence, these countries moved from a scenario with wide-PPCs to one with narrow-PPCs. 
As mentioned before, a wide-PPC requires hotels to offer a given OTA the most favored prices 
in comparison to any other distribution channel, while a narrow-PPC allows a hotel to offer 
better prices through competing OTAs and through its own direct channel, provided that 
these latter discounts are part of a loyalty program. 
According to these competition authorities, the adoption of narrow PPCs should generate 
a reduction in Booking.com commission rates and/or in an improvement of its quality of 
service, which will ultimately lead to lower room prices and/or better services for final 
consumers. Moreover, the commitments should also make it easier for new OTAs to enter the 
market or to expand their operations. 
Some countries have not even accepted narrow-PPCs. For instance, in July 2015 the French 
parliament passed a law that prohibits PPCs. Similarly, in December 2015, the German 
competition authority prohibited the narrow PPC clauses of Booking.com. 11  During the 
second half of 2016 the Austrian government also banned PPCs in contracts between hotels 
and OTAs and Italy followed suit in mid-2017.12 Table 1 summarizes National Competition 
Authority (NCA) decisions regarding PPCs in Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 See Hunold et al. (2018) for an evaluation of the effects of the ban of Booking.com`s PPCs in this case. 
12 For more details, see the following online article: http://hotelanalyst.co.uk/2016/08/01/austria-moves-on-rate-
parity/ 
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Table 1 – Summary of NCA and legal decisions concerning PPCs (2013-2017) 
Country Date Decision Observations 
Germany December-2013 
Prohibition of PPCs used by 
HRS (major OTA in 
Germany) 
 
France, Italy, 
Sweden 
April-2015 
Commitments by Booking 
to switch from wide-PPCs 
to narrow-PPCs 
Booking and Expedia 
commit to narrow PPCs in 
all E.U. countries starting in 
July-2015 and in August-
2015, respectively. 
France August-2015 
Loi Macron voids all OTAs’ 
PPCs 
 
Germany December-2015 
Prohibition of Booking 
narrow-PPCs 
Expedia continues to apply 
narrow-PPCs in Germany 
Austria November 20116 All PPCs are rendered null  
Italy August 2017 
Rate parity clauses are 
banned 
 
Source: Report on the Monitoring Exercise Carried Out in the Online Hotel Booking Sector by E.U. Competition Authorities 
in 2016, Article 1 (166) of Annual Competition Law of Italy. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
Our dataset contains proprietary hotel-level data, for every Tuesday of years 2014 (pre-wide-
PPC removal) and 2016 (post-wide-PPC removal), for different hotel chains that operate 
across a large number of countries in the E.U. and the rest of the world. We classified hotels 
in three different groups, namely (i) budget hotels, (ii) mid-level hotels, and (iii) luxury hotels. 
In all, we have information on hotels located in and out of the EU, accounting for 
approximately 1.6 million bookings per year.13,14 
Every observation in the sample contains information of the number of room-nights 
sold and revenues (net of loyalty discounts) for bookings made through different channels: 
 
13 We do not consider chain-country combinations for which there is only information of only one year (either only 
2014 or only 2016). Thus, under this criterion we dropped 0.26% of observations from sample of hotels in Europe. 
Similarly, we dropped 0.5% of observations from the sample of hotels located outside Europe. 
14 Hotels located in 13 different countries account for almost 80% of the observations in the sample of hotels located 
outside Europe.  
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the hotels’ own websites and two major OTAs. For instance, for the case of the E.U., these 
three channels account for almost 90% of the rooms booked online during the period covered 
for the sample. Table 2 exhibits basic summary statistics of booking prices of hotels located in 
the E.U. for the three different types of hotel (i.e., budget, mid-level and luxury) with prices 
normalized by the average price of the rooms sold in 2014 by hotel type.  
 
Table 2 – Summary statistics on booking prices 
Hotel Type Var. 
Booking Year    
2014 2016 
Budget Bookings 904,046 1,087,017 
  Mean 1.0000 1.0009 
  Std. Dev. 0.3808 0.3977 
  Min. 0.0000 0.0000 
  Mac. 4.8997 5.1351 
Mid-level Bookings 419,454 555,098 
  Mean 1.0000 1.0183 
  Std. Dev. 0.3886 0.3778 
  Min. 0.0000 0.0000 
  Mac. 6.9746 5.4637 
Luxury Bookings 109,842 130,730 
  Mean 1.0000 1.0780 
  Std. Dev. 0.4970 0.4646 
  Min. 0.0000 0.0000 
  Mac. 15.6365 5.1451 
Notes: For each hotel type, all prices have been normalized by the average retail 
price of 2014. In addition, all prices are net of loyalty discounts given to customers.  
 
Figure 1 – Comparison of retail prices on direct channels and OTAs  
 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the percentage of mid-level hotels in E.U. countries for which the 
direct channel is on average cheaper than OTAs by at least 5%. In addition, each hotel-month 
observation has been weighed by the number of rooms booked on the direct channel (in 
order to compute a weighted average). The time at which the regulatory change happened 
is indicated by the vertical line. 
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Figure 1 displays the percentage of cases for which the average retail price for the 
direct channel was cheaper than the average retail price for OTAs. As shown in the graph, this 
percentage substantially increased after the regulation change (represented by the vertical line 
in the graph).15  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
The adoption of OTAs’ commitments in the E.U. represents an exogenous variation of the 
contractual relationships between these platforms and hotels. This new regulation provides a 
structural change similar to a natural experiment that allows us to measure the impact of the 
switch from wide to narrow PPCs (or removal of PPCs in the cases of France and Germany) 
on different outcomes of interest. The idea is to compare the evolution of booking prices, 
before and after the adoption of the commitments by major OTAs, and across countries 
impacted and not impacted by the change in policy (as displayed in Table 1). Thus, a reduced 
form before-after analysis and a difference-in-differences approach are implemented in order 
to test the impact of this new policy on booking prices.  
 
4.1 Estimating the impact of the policy change for the E.U. countries 
 
The adoption of narrow-PPCs allows hotels to offer discounted retail prices, provided that 
these discounts are offered to the members of their loyalty programs. Therefore, thanks to 
these devices, one should expect the actual prices paid by travelers on the direct channel to be 
lower in 2016 than in 2014, compared to prices paid by travelers on OTAs.16 In order to test 
this hypothesis we estimate the following reduced-form Linear Probability Model: 
 
15 Note that average retail price is across all room types reserved by clients. Our conjecture is that higher quality 
rooms may be more likely to be booked via the direct channel than standard room types, suggesting that the 
average price for direct channels would be somewhat higher than the average price for indirect channels, even if 
room prices are identical across channels for the same room type. 
16 Based on a nested-logit model of demand, we test whether channel substitution is relevant from the point 
of view of consumers, as reported in the Appendix. If this is indeed the case, then any contractual clause affecting 
the relative retail prices posted on different channels is likely to have an impact on the degree of competition across 
channels. Results from the demand estimation suggest that channel substitution is indeed relevant, with travelers 
being more likely to substitute among channels (for a given hotel-type), rather than to substitute among hotel-
types. The presence of multiple channels (including the direct channel) may play an important role in disciplining 
the behavior of major OTAs and in mitigating any potential form of market power exploitation at the retail level. 
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 𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝛿 = 𝛼 × 𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 × 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 , (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝛿  is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the average retail price of the 
direct channel for hotel 𝑖 at date 𝑡 is cheaper than the average retail price posted on OTAs, by 
more than 𝛿%.17 The idea is to capture whether the probability of the direct channel being 
cheaper than OTAs on a given date has increased after the switch to narrow-PPCs. The 
variable 𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡  is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the booking date 
belongs to year 2016, the period after the switch to narrow-PPCs. In addition, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector 
of observable hotel characteristics which, in this case, considers the average length of stay for 
the three different channels (i.e., the two OTAs and the direct channel) of the reservations 
booked on a given date 𝑡. We use clustered standard errors at the city level. The coefficient of 
interest 𝛼 represents a before-after estimator of the impact of the switch to narrow-PPC in the 
EU. 
Results are displayed in Table 3, considering values for 𝛿 of 2.5% (Columns 1 to 3), 5% 
(Columns 4 to 6) and 10% (Columns 7 to 9). In turn, the lengths of stay variables are classified 
into direct channel (DC), and 𝑂𝑇𝐴1  and 𝑂𝑇𝐴2 . As seen in the table, there is a significant 
increase in the probability of the direct channel being on average cheaper than OTAs post-
switch to narrow-PPC, for all the values of 𝛿 and for all hotel types.  However, the magnitude 
of the coefficients is larger for the most expensive hotel types (i.e., mid-level and luxury). 
These results are robust to the introduction of hotel fixed effects.18 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the fact that consumers are sensitive to price differences between channels may suggest that any 
restriction on the ability of hotels to offer differentiated prices across online distribution channels can result in 
negative consequences for travelers’ welfare. 
 
17 A similar econometric approach is adopted by the report on the monitoring exercise of the online booking sector 
carried out by the EC, available at the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf  
18  Note that in this case we do not introduce time-fixed effects because they are collinear with the variable 
𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡. 
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Table 3 – Before-after analysis on E.U. countries 
 Probability of the direct channel being on average cheaper than OTAs: 𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝛿  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury 
 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 
Narrow PPC 0.0398*** 0.146*** 0.158*** 0.0317*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.0177** 0.108*** 0.0803*** 
 (0.00990) (0.0109) (0.0284) (0.00970) (0.0102) (0.0268) (0.00767) (0.00866) (0.0213) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴1) -0.0288*** 0.00652* 0.0288** -0.0231*** 0.00857** 0.0324** -0.0172*** 0.00708** 0.0269** 
 (0.00545) (0.00367) (0.0139) (0.00549) (0.00352) (0.0141) (0.00398) (0.00349) (0.0123) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴2) -0.00636** -0.00355 -0.00892 -0.00403 -0.00190 -0.00728 0.000616 0.00146 1.47e-05 
 (0.00286) (0.00291) (0.00909) (0.00286) (0.00274) (0.00858) (0.00250) (0.00255) (0.00762) 
Length of stay (DC) -0.0119** -0.00838 -0.0164 -0.00846* -0.00678 -0.0132 -0.00211 -0.00766* -0.0143 
 (0.00510) (0.00534) (0.0175) (0.00476) (0.00531) (0.0152) (0.00422) (0.00436) (0.0122) 
Constant 0.535*** 0.361*** 0.238*** 0.447*** 0.309*** 0.197*** 0.273*** 0.231*** 0.116** 
 (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0667) (0.0169) (0.0179) (0.0625) (0.0141) (0.0158) (0.0504) 
Observations 37,832 28,741 2,568 37,832 28,741 2,568 37,832 28,741 2,568 
N. of Hotels 643 485 30 643 485 30 643 485 30 
Month dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the city level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation of Equation 
(1) only considers hotels for which there is at least one online booking during both years 2014 and 2016. 
 
 
In addition, in order to verify whether these results are robust to the comparison with 
the evolution of retail prices of hotels located outside the EU, we estimate the following Linear 
Probability Model: 
 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝛿 = 𝛼1 × 𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼2 × 𝑒𝑢𝑖 + 𝛼3 × 𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡 × 𝑒𝑢𝑖                        
+ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 × 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 . 
(2) 
 
The dependent variable in Equation (2) is the same as in Equation (1). We include the binary 
variable 𝑒𝑢𝑖  which takes the value of one if hotel 𝑖  is located in the EU. The interaction 
between 𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡  and 𝑒𝑢𝑖  captures differences between the evolutions of prices in the 
E.U. compared to hotels located in other continents, and differences between prices before 
and after the switch to narrow-PPC. Thus, the coefficient of interest 𝛼3 represents a difference-
in-differences estimator of the impact of the switch to narrow-PPC on the probability of the 
direct channel being cheaper than OTAs in the EU. 
 Results are reported in Table 4 and suggest that the probability of the direct channel 
being cheaper than OTAs has indeed increased in the E.U. compared to hotels located in other 
continents, but only for mid-level and luxury hotels. These results are robust to the 
introduction of hotel fixed effects and month fixed effects. 
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Table 4 – Difference-in-differences analysis on E.U. versus other continents  
 Probability of the direct channel being on average cheaper than OTAs: 𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝛿  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury 
 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 
Narrow-PPC 0.0603*** 0.0694*** 0.0685*** 0.0546*** 0.0572*** 0.0583** 0.0318** 0.0461*** 0.0550** 
 (0.0152) (0.0141) (0.0248) (0.0133) (0.0143) (0.0244) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0234) 
EU -0.0589*** -0.199*** -0.276*** -0.0392* -0.197*** -0.266*** -0.0255 -0.174*** -0.234*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0175) (0.0391) (0.0215) (0.0178) (0.0391) (0.0181) (0.0169) (0.0346) 
Narrow-PPC x EU -0.0195 0.0760*** 0.0884** -0.0222 0.0814*** 0.0683* -0.0137 0.0620*** 0.0234 
 (0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0373) (0.0166) (0.0175) (0.0362) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0315) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴1) -0.0153*** 0.00638** 0.00124 -0.0111*** 0.00886*** 0.00156 -0.00565* 0.0104*** 0.00189 
 (0.00382) (0.00298) (0.00619) (0.00389) (0.00289) (0.00619) (0.00315) (0.00289) (0.00573) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴2) -0.00587*** -0.00127 -0.0205*** -0.00339 -0.000234 -0.0189*** 0.00133 0.00247 -0.0177*** 
 (0.00214) (0.00236) (0.00454) (0.00218) (0.00232) (0.00401) (0.00199) (0.00212) (0.00406) 
Length of stay (DC) -0.0119*** -0.0181*** -0.0270*** -0.00961*** -0.0165*** -0.0311*** -0.00848*** -0.0150*** -0.0276*** 
 (0.00344) (0.00456) (0.00928) (0.00328) (0.00454) (0.00967) (0.00314) (0.00379) (0.0104) 
Constant 0.574*** 0.585*** 0.576*** 0.469*** 0.529*** 0.545*** 0.291*** 0.420*** 0.442*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0228) (0.0466) (0.0237) (0.0229) (0.0482) (0.0204) (0.0212) (0.0458) 
Observations 49,694 36,769 6,576 49,694 36,769 6,576 49,694 36,769 6,576 
N. of Hotels 916 656 102 916 656 102 916 656 102 
Month dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the city level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation of Equation 
(2) only considers hotels for which there is at least one online booking during both years 2014 and 2016. 
 
 
4.2 The case of France and Germany 
 
One way to verify whether the increase in the probability of the direct channel being cheaper 
than OTAs is explained by the switch to narrow PPC (in E.U. countries), or by the ban of all 
kinds of PPCs (mainly in France and Germany), is to test whether there is a differentiated 
impact in France and Germany compared to the rest of E.U. countries. Tables 5 and 6 replicate 
the results displayed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively, but splitting the coefficient of interest 
(i.e., either the before-after coefficient in Table 3, or the difference-in-differences coefficient in 
Table 4) into three different dummy variables according to whether hotel 𝑖  is located in 
France, Germany or another E.U. country.  
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Table 5 – Before-after analysis on E.U. countries with fixed effect for France and Germany 
 Probability of the direct channel being on average cheaper than OTAs: 𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝛿  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury 
 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 
Narrow PPC x France 
0.0312*** 0.0490*** 0.112*** 0.0244*** 0.0452*** 0.0927*** 0.00931 0.0269*** 0.0709*** 
(0.00858) (0.0107) (0.0210) (0.00860) (0.00924) (0.0189) (0.00758) (0.00891) (0.0231) 
Narrow PPC x 
Germany 
0.0225 0.237*** 0.158** 0.0168 0.229*** 0.144** 0.00968 0.202*** 0.0800** 
(0.0171) (0.0133) (0.0655) (0.0154) (0.0139) (0.0633) (0.0133) (0.0143) (0.0392) 
Narrow PPC x Other 
E.U. countries 
0.0563*** 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.0458** 0.186*** 0.145*** 0.0308** 0.140*** 0.0861** 
(0.0190) (0.0145) (0.0399) (0.0184) (0.0150) (0.0400) (0.0140) (0.0128) (0.0346) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴1) -0.0290*** 0.00672* 0.0300** -0.0233*** 0.00880** 0.0345** -0.0174*** 0.00770** 0.0294** 
 
(0.00544) (0.00371) (0.0140) (0.00549) (0.00354) (0.0141) (0.00397) (0.00354) (0.0122) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴2) -0.00663** -0.00564* -0.00812 -0.00427 -0.00378 -0.00588 0.000361 8.55e-05 0.00190 
 
(0.00288) (0.00293) (0.00892) (0.00288) (0.00275) (0.00851) (0.00253) (0.00251) (0.00766) 
Length of stay (DC) -0.0123** -0.0110** -0.0152 -0.00885* -0.00906* -0.0106 -0.00259 -0.00913** -0.0102 
 
(0.00514) (0.00541) (0.0176) (0.00478) (0.00535) (0.0162) (0.00422) (0.00433) (0.0133) 
Constant 0.537*** 0.371*** 0.234*** 0.449*** 0.318*** 0.185*** 0.275*** 0.236*** 0.0981* 
 
(0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0684) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0664) (0.0140) (0.0155) (0.0542) 
Observations 37,832 28,741 2,568 37,832 28,741 2,568 37,832 28,741 2,568 
N. of Hotels 643 485 30 643 485 30 643 485 30 
Month dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the city level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation of Equation 
(1) only considers hotels for which there is at least one online booking during both years 2014 and 2016. 
 
 
Results from the before-after estimations in Table 5 show that the coefficients for 
France are almost always positive and significant, but lower in magnitude compared to 
Germany and the rest of E.U. countries (on average), at least for the mid-level and luxury 
hotels. In turn, coefficients for Germany and the rest of E.U. countries are in general similar 
(except for budget hotels). 
Results of the difference-in-differences estimations displayed in Table 6 suggest that 
there is no significant effect for France, and a positive and significant effect for Germany but 
only for the case of mid-level hotels. These results can be interpreted in two different ways. 
First, they may cast doubt on the effectiveness of the regulatory intervention that totally or 
partially banned PPCs on these countries, as no significant effect is observed compared to the 
average effect on non-EC countries. However, it must be noticed that the results for France 
could have been disrupted by the impact of the unmeasurable effects of terrorist attacks in 
Paris during this period. For Germany, note that in theory the narrow PPCban does not apply 
for other OTAs. Second, the lack of significance for these two countries compared to hotels 
located in non-E.U. countries (i.e., the non significativity of the difference-in-differences 
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coefficients), may reflect the fact that the regulatory change in the EC had effects on the 
booking prices paid for reservations in hotels located outside the EU. Indeed, as the before-
after coefficient in all the regressions is positive and significant, it may be the case that the 
switch from narrow to wide PPC had an effect on the average booking prices paid in and out 
of the E.U. (i.e., the “Narrow-PPC” coefficient). For instance, prices paid by EC citizens for 
hotels located outside the E.U. could be also impacted by the switch to narrow-PPC or by the 
ban of PPCs; if the fraction of these type of reservations is significant in our sample, then it 
could be the case that the policy change had a significant impact in both E.U. and non-E.U. 
countries. 
 
 
Table 6 –Difference-in-differences analysis on E.U. versus other continents  
with fixed effect for France and Germany 
 Probability of the direct channel being on average cheaper than OTAs: 𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝛿  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury Budget Mid-level Luxury 
 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 2.5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 5% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 𝛿 = 10% 
Narrow-PPC 0.0603*** 0.0699*** 0.0686*** 0.0546*** 0.0579*** 0.0585** 0.0317** 0.0467*** 0.0550** 
 
(0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0248) (0.0133) (0.0144) (0.0245) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0234) 
EU -0.0578** -0.197*** -0.274*** -0.0382* -0.194*** -0.265*** -0.0245 -0.172*** -0.233*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0175) (0.0394) (0.0214) (0.0178) (0.0394) (0.0181) (0.0169) (0.0347) 
Narrow-PPC x 
France 
-0.0292* -0.0198 0.0450 -0.0314* -0.0109 0.0314 -0.0241 -0.0179 0.0163 
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0323) (0.0161) (0.0170) (0.0315) (0.0148) (0.0160) (0.0334) 
Narrow-PPC x 
Germany 
-0.0357 0.162*** 0.0838 -0.0364* 0.165*** 0.0662 -0.0223 0.150*** -0.00574 
(0.0226) (0.0194) (0.0642) (0.0201) (0.0199) (0.0610) (0.0180) (0.0194) (0.0342) 
Narrow-PPC x Other 
E.U. countries 
-0.00199 0.126*** 0.113** -0.00589 0.129*** 0.0880* 0.00229 0.0942*** 0.0349 
(0.0245) (0.0201) (0.0474) (0.0229) (0.0206) (0.0471) (0.0187) (0.0183) (0.0418) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴1) -0.0154*** 0.00666** 0.00132 -0.0112*** 0.00915*** 0.00161 -0.00573* 0.0108*** 0.00186 
 
(0.00382) (0.00300) (0.00620) (0.00389) (0.00289) (0.00619) (0.00314) (0.00290) (0.00573) 
Length of stay (𝑂𝑇𝐴2) -0.00603*** -0.00242 -0.0204*** -0.00354 -0.00126 -0.0188*** 0.00118 0.00167 -0.0177*** 
 
(0.00216) (0.00241) (0.00454) (0.00219) (0.00235) (0.00402) (0.00200) (0.00212) (0.00406) 
Length of stay (DC) -0.0121*** -0.0198*** -0.0271*** -0.00981*** -0.0180*** -0.0311*** -0.00870*** -0.0160*** -0.0276*** 
 
(0.00345) (0.00455) (0.00929) (0.00328) (0.00453) (0.00969) (0.00313) (0.00375) (0.0104) 
Constant 0.575*** 0.590*** 0.575*** 0.470*** 0.533*** 0.545*** 0.291*** 0.422*** 0.442*** 
 
(0.0239) (0.0228) (0.0466) (0.0236) (0.0229) (0.0483) (0.0203) (0.0212) (0.0458) 
Observations 49,694 36,769 6,576 49,694 36,769 6,576 49,694 36,769 6,576 
N. of Hotels 916 656 102 916 656 102 916 656 102 
Month dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the city level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation of Equation 
(2) only considers hotels for which there is at least one online booking during both years 2014 and 2016. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper is aimed at assessing the impact of the wide-PPC removal on online booking prices 
that resulted from the commitments adopted by the two largest OTAs of the market in Europe, 
during the year 2015. Results from both a set of before-after specifications and a set of 
differences-in-differences specifications suggest that following the wide-PPC removal in the 
EU, the probability of the direct channel being on average cheaper than OTAs has significantly 
increased at least for the groups of mid-level and luxury hotels. Thus, these results shed light 
on the potentially effects of PPCs on online booking prices. In particular, the evidence 
presented in this paper suggests that the presence of wide-PPCs between OTAs and hotel own 
direct channels could result in a softening of price-competition among these channels.  
However, the difference-in-differences estimator shows no significant effect in France, and 
a significant effect in Germany but only for the mid-level hotels’ segment. In these two 
countries, MFN clauses between OTAs and hotels have been totally or partially banned. These 
latter results can be interpreted in two different ways. First, they may cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of the policy intervention. However, it must be noticed that the results for France 
could have been disrupted by the impact of the unmeasurable effects of terrorist attacks in 
Paris in 2015, even though these were mostly outside the dates reviewed. For Germany, even 
if Booking.com is not allowed to engage in PPCs with hotels, this legal obligation does not 
necessarily apply to other OTAs. Second, they may be caused by the fact that the direct 
channel could have become relatively cheaper than OTAs in both E.U. and non-E.U. countries. 
Indeed, this could be the case if, for example, retail reservation prices paid by EC citizens for 
hotel rooms located outside the E.U. may be also influenced by the policy change. Indeed, as 
the before-after coefficient in Table 6 is always positive and significant, this may be the case. 
Our results are relevant not only for the specific questions related to impacts of hotel and 
OTA PPC clauses, but also provide empirical evidence on the nature of MFN impacts. While 
we do not suggest the results are necessarily directly applicable to other industries, the results 
may provide information on default expectations when key industry characteristics are 
similar. 
Future work could usefully develop a structural model of supply and demand for 
different channels and hotel types in order to understand the ways that MFN clauses affect 
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buyer and seller reactions. Such an extension could explore how substitution patterns affect 
outcomes and examine whether platform market power exists in the hotel sector. 
 
 
Appendix - Channel substitution 
 
 
Here, we build a discrete choice model of demand for online hotel booking channel using 
aggregated data. A product or service 𝑗 is defined as a hotel-room booked in a certain channel-
hotel-type combination. We consider for now three online channels: OTA1, OTA2 and the 
direct channel (own hotel websites). In addition, as in the previous section hotels are classified 
in three types: budget, mid-level and luxury. Moreover, a market is defined as a city-date 
combination. Using these definitions, the indirect utility that consumer 𝑖  derives from 
booking a hotel-room offered by channel-hotel-type 𝑗 is defined as follows (for the sake of 
exposition we omit the subscript 𝑚 denoting a market):  
 
 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝑥𝑗𝛽 + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗, (5) 
 
where 𝑝𝑗 represents the average booking price of a hotel-room offered by channel-hotel-type 
𝑗 (for a given market). In turn, 𝑥𝑗 is a vector of observable characteristics, which in this case 
only considers the average length of stay of reservations booked on a given date. The variable 
𝜉𝑗 corresponds to unobservable product characteristics, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 is a random utility term that 
represents an individual-specific taste parameter, and its assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed with a Type-I extreme-value distribution. 
 It is assumed that consumers` choice of channel is nested on the choice of type of hotel, 
which allows unobserved consumer heterogeneity in the valuation of the hotel-type 
dimension. (See Björnerstedt and Verboven, 2016.) This nesting structure is convenient for 
two reasons. First, it allows us to directly test whether substitution across channels is more 
likely than substitution across hotel-types. Indeed, the nested-logit structure accounts for the 
possibility of market segmentation, by allowing cross-price elasticities between channels (for 
a given hotel-type), to be greater than cross-price elasticities between different hotel-types. 
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Second, one feature of nested-logit models is that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) assumption must be satisfied between products of the same nest, but not across products 
belonging to different nests. Thus, it seems more realistic to assume that the IIA assumption 
holds for channel choice, rather than for hotel-type choice.19   
The nesting structure is illustrated in Figure A.1. In this diagram, travelers can choose 
between nine different products given by the different channel-hotel-type combinations. 
 
 
Figure A.1 – Consumer`s choice of hotel-room 
 
 
Following Berry (1994), this demand model can be estimated with aggregated market 
shares through the following equation:  
 
 ln (
𝑠𝑗
𝑠0⁄ ) = 𝑥𝑗𝛽 + 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝜎 ln(𝑠𝑗,𝑔) + 𝜉𝑗 (6) 
 
where 𝑠𝑗 is the market share of channel-hotel-type 𝑗 with respect to the size of the market, 
which we define as the number of air-passenger arrivals on a given city-month. In turn, 𝑠0 is 
the market share of the outside option, and  𝑠𝑗,𝑔 is the market share of channel-hotel-type 𝑗 
 
19 For instance, in an extreme scenario in which luxury hotels exit the market, it is very likely that travelers who 
prefer this type of hotels would switch to the closest option in terms of comfort (i.e., mid-level hotels), rather than 
switching to low-cost hotels. Thus, it is clear that the IIA assumption would not hold in such case, considering that 
IIA would require market shares of both budget and mid-level hotels to increase by the same proportions. 
Consumer
Budget hotels
OTA 1 OTA 2
Direct 
Channel
Mid-level hotels
OTA 1 OTA 2
Direct 
Channel
Luxury hotels
OTA 1 OTA 2
Direct 
Channel
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within each nest. The coefficient 𝛼 is a measure of price-sensitivity of demand with respect to 
prices, and 𝜎 captures correlation in preferences for products that belong to the same nest (its 
value should satisfy 0 ≤ 𝜎 ≤ 1). In other words, if 𝜎 is significantly different to zero, it would 
be an indicator that substitution within products of the same nest is more likely than 
substitution across products that belong to different nests. We also include product and time 
fixed effects. 
 Note that both 𝑝𝑗  and 𝑠𝑗,𝑔  in Equation (6) are endogenous. Following a similar 
approach to the one proposed by Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016), we use the number of 
competitors as instruments; the idea is to capture heterogeneous supply conditions across 
markets that may not be necessarily correlated with 𝜉𝑗 in the short run (e.g., entry of new 
hotels motivated by long-run considerations). For a given product 𝑗 , the following 
instruments are constructed: (i) number of competing hotels within the same channel and 
hotel-type, (ii) number of competing hotels within the same channel, but from different hotel-
types, (iii) number of competing hotels from other channels, but within the same hotel-type, 
and (iv) number of competing hotels from other channels, and from different hotel-types.  
 Table A.1 exhibits basic summary statistics. Each observation in the sample is a 
combination of hotel-type, channel, city and date. Note that since the number of commercial 
air-passenger arrivals is used as proxy for market size, the table only considers observations 
for which there is a perfect match between the name of the city in which hotels and airports 
are located. 20 This reduces the size of the sample to one-fifth or our original sample.21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Air-passenger transport, by main airports and countries are obtained from Eurostat (link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/transport/data/database) 
21 In a future version of the paper, we expect to increase the number of cities included in this section, 
by considering matches between hotels and airports located in neighbor municipalities. 
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Table A.1 – Summary statistics (EU, booking-year 2016) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 25,610 1.4000 0.7296 0.1556 13.7301 
Market share 25,610 0.0112 0.0232 0.0000 0.6789 
Length of stay 25,610 1.7922 0.7794 1.0000 16.0000 
Number of hotels:      
Same type, same channel 25,610 1.2246 3.1411 0.0000 31.0000 
Same type, other channels 25,610 4.3115 6.2652 0.0000 64.0000 
Other types, same channel 25,610 2.7834 5.7791 0.0000 63.0000 
Other types, other channels 25,610 5.5426 11.4621 0.0000 121.0000 
 
 
Table A.2 displays our demand estimates. The 𝛼 coefficient has the expected negative sign in 
all specifications, and as it is usually the case in the estimation of demand models, the OLS 
coefficient underestimates its magnitude. The 𝜎 is significantly higher than zero, suggesting 
that travelers are indeed more likely to substitute across channels (for a given hotel-type), 
rather than to substitute across hotel-types. In specifications (3) and (6), we included city fixed-
effects in order to capture market-specific characteristics that can be heterogeneous across 
cities, for instance, marketing expenditures. 
 
 
Table A.2 – Nested logit estimates (EU, booking-year 2016) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
VARIABLES ln (
𝑠𝑗
𝑠0⁄ ) ln (
𝑠𝑗
𝑠0⁄ ) ln (
𝑠𝑗
𝑠0⁄ ) ln (
𝑠𝑗
𝑠0⁄ ) ln (
𝑠𝑗
𝑠0⁄ ) ln (
𝑠𝑗
𝑠0⁄ ) 
       
(𝛼) Price -0.0443*** -0.0201** -0.0151*** -0.132*** -0.141*** -0.234*** 
 (0.00789) (0.00718) (0.00291) (0.0227) (0.0305) (0.0550) 
(𝜎) ln(𝑠𝑗,𝑔) 0.967*** 0.961*** 0.894*** 0.898*** 0.864*** 0.796*** 
 (0.0691) (0.0719) (0.0335) (0.0934) (0.133) (0.283) 
Length of stay -0.178*** -0.161*** 0.157*** -0.142*** -0.135*** 0.243** 
 (0.0359) (0.0347) (0.0324) (0.0320) (0.0373) (0.108) 
Constant -3.665*** -3.435*** -4.027*** -2.748*** -2.478*** -2.428*** 
 (0.210) (0.152) (0.136) (0.261) (0.357) (0.695) 
       
Observations 25,610 25,610 25,610 25,610 25,610 25,610 
Number of products 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Product F.E. NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Month F.E. NO YES YES NO YES YES 
City F.E. NO NO TES NO NO TES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
22 
 
References 
 
1. Akman, P. and D. Sokol (2017), “Online RPM and MFN under Antitrust Law and 
Economics”, Review of Industrial Organization, 50(2), 133-151. 
2. Autor, D. H. (2003), “Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine 
to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing”,  Journal of Labor Economics, 2003, vol. 21, 
no. 1 
3. Boik, A. and K.S. Corts (2016), “The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on 
Competition and Entry”, The Journal of Law and Economics 59, no. 1 (February 2016): 
105-134 
4. Edelman, B. and J. Wright (2015), “Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3), 1283-1328. 
5. European Commission (2016), “Report on the Monitoring Exercise Carried Out in the 
Online Hotel Booking Sector by E.U. Competition Authorities in 2016”, available in the 
following link: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf 
6. Ezrachi, A. (2016), “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce”, 
European Competition Journal, 11(3), 488-519. 
7. Fletcher, A. and M. Hviid (2017), “Broad Retail MFN Clauses: Are They RPM at its 
Worst?”, Antitrust Journal, 81(1), 61-98. 
8. González-Díaz, F.E. and M. Bennett (2015), “”The Law and Economics of Most-Favoured 
Nation Clauses”,”Competition Law & Policy Debate, 1(3), 26-41. 
9. Hunold, M., R. Kesler, U. Laitenberger and F. Schlütter (2018), “Evaluation of Best Price 
Clauses in Hotel Bookings”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 
2018, 61, pp.542-571  
10. Johnson, J. P, (2017), "The Agency Model and MFN Clauses",  The Review of Economic 
Studies  84.3  (2017):  1151-1185 
11. Johansen, B.O. and T. Vergé (2017), “Platform Price Parity Clauses with Direct Sales”, 
University of Bergen Working Paper No. 1.17. 
12. Mantovani, A., C. Piga, and C. Reggiani, (2017), “The Dynamics of Online Hotel Prices 
and the E.U. Booking.Com Case”. NET Institute Working Paper No. 17-04. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3049339 
23 
 
13. Proserpio, D., and G. Zervas (2017), “Online Reputation Management: Estimating the 
Impact of Management Responses on Consumer Reviews”, Marketing Science, 
permanent link: https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1043 
14. Sridhar, M. and R.A. Winter (2006), “Price-Matching Guarantees”, The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 37(2), 449-465. 
15. Wals, F. and M.P. Schinkel (2018), “Platform Monopolization by Narrow-PPC-BPG 
Combination: Booking et al.”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 
61, November 2018, Pages 572-589 
16. Wang, C. and J. Wright (2020), ”Search Platforms: Showrooming and Price Parity 
Clauses”, the RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 51, Issue 1 Spring 2020, Pages 32-58 . 
 
